HUNGARIAN KALEIDOSCOPE: The 1956 Hungarian Revolution in the Dense Network of International Connections*

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"Tell me what you think about Hungary and I will tell you who you are..."
Zycie Gospodarce, Warsaw, November 26, 1956

Revolutions are always highly complex events which can complicate historical remembrance. To understand their impact, it is important to take a holistic view of their progression and connections, especially in the interconnected modern world. This paper prevents some of the variety of impacts of the event and the ways in which various networks, from the individual to the international, were affected by and affected the event. Incorporating the multitude of networks and positions affected by the revolution allows for a construction of a more complex understanding of history. While the space available does not allow for a full investigation of the variety of networks touched on by the revolution of 1956 it, by providing a sample of the complex networks involved, provides a new framework for further research. Taking a holistic approach to the revolution this paper reviews the variety of complex networks affected by the revolution and the impact of existing networks and systems of belief on the responses to the crisis.

Key words: Networks, Hungarian Revolution, 1956, Historical Memory, Refugees

1. INTRODUCTION

1956 was a turbulent year for both the Socialist and Capitalist world. The year added the "Secret Speech", a crisis in Poland, a revolution in Hungary, and a war over the Suez Canal to a world still recovering from the Korean War and the Formosa Crisis. However, the Hungarian revolution was no simple increase in tension as it aggravated tensions within the Socialist bloc, revealed underlying hypocrisies in US foreign policy, and resonated with Hungarian émigré communities and flooded the west with a wave of refugees. How should we, more than fifty years after the event, understand the complexities involved in the event itself and the responses by various governments and organizations throughout the world?

In order to understand this, we must recognize the nature of the interconnected world in which we live and have lived. All actors are embedded in a dense network of connections, from the bipolarity of the interstate system, to religious networks, to the inter-personal networks formed through family and community. The existence of these networks complicates any attempt to understand the dramatic events which took place in Hungary 1956 and explains the variety of reactions to the event. Despite this complication, it is important to take a holistic approach because it is specifically these dense networks, the interactions between them, and the impact of the event upon them which must be remembered. To ignore any one of these networks, such as the Jewish exodus from Hungary or the impact on Hungarian émigré communities in Canada and the US, is to ignore important aspects of the impact of the revolution. Indeed, the study of networks allows cultural and historical studies to move beyond presumptions of causality to study the transformation of forms and contact between different forms (Levine 2015, 113).

Admittedly this is a project which cannot be entirely undertaken in the space available in the space allowed. However, just because it is impossible to optimize it does not mean that it is not a valuable undertaking. This article shall attempt to add to the discussion on the remembrance of this tumultuous event by highlighting the variety of networks which were touched by the revolution and attempt to show how it is necessary to take this holistic approach to remembrance. Proceeding first through a discussion of the event the article will then proceed through a discussion of the variety of networks; national and international, local and global, which were impacted by the events of 1956.

2. HISTORY

The Socialist bloc in 1956 was rocked by a fundamental crisis of leadership and confidence when the process of de-Stalinization formally began as Soviet Premier Nikita Kruschev. Kruschev attempted to exorcise the ghost of Stalin from the Soviet system by denouncing Stalin, and his crimes, to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and to have his speech printed and distributed amongst the communist parties in the bloc (Paczkowski and Bukharin 2015, 372). Intending to shore up support at home and to expose the crimes of the "cult" of Stalin so a new historical memory could be constructed the speech instead provoked reactions and questions which pushed the interrogation of the past and of the system beyond the ambiguous "official" line taken in the speech (Jones 2013, 23–4). The first cracks appeared in Poland where, in addition to dealing with a crisis in leadership caused by the resignation of the entire Polish Politburo, workers began demonstrating in Poznan demanding increased bread and better conditions (Luthi 2008, 54). These protests, which were eventually resolved to the satisfaction of the Soviets and to a certain extent the protesters, served as an inspiration for the events in Hungary.

Students began protesting, officially, on the 23rd of October when students from the Technical University joined those of the Arts Faculty and marched together to the statue of General Bem, a hero from the revolution of 1848 (Cox 2006, 42). However, events quickly spiralled out of the governments control and by the 24th Soviet troops had been requested by General Secretary of the Hungarian Working People's Party Ernő Gerő (Granville 2001, 453). The popular ex-Chairman of the Council of Ministers Imre Nagy was invited back into the government that night and, despite initial optimism, it became clear that events were beyond his control and the Soviets invaded to overthrow his regime and install János Kádár (Cox 2006, 42). These events, which proceeded with all the turmoil and chaos as befits a revolution, touched on many networks from the international to the national which helped frame their interpretation of and responses to the events.

3. CHINA

As there was no independent media in China during the 1950s it represents the least networked state to be discussed here. However, there still existed networks of individuals within the ruling clique of China and of course China was embedded in the international system and as such was embedded in the political

and ideological networks which made up the system. Internally the party created a single, official narrative of events as presented in its newspaper: The *People's Daily* (Renmin Ribao). However, this presentation of events was by no means a single coherent discourse which reflected the evolving position of the regime at different stages of the revolution.

October 27 marked the first report in *People's Daily* titled: "Students in Budapest and other cities held peaceful demonstrations; counterrevolutionary elements infiltrated and created armed riots; Hungarian government invited Soviet army in Hungary to restore order" which set the tone for the following few days that the political upheaval was dying down"[1]. November 1st, the newspaper published the "*Declaration by Soviet Government on the Principles of Development and further Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist States*", in which the Soviet government said it was ready to negotiate the withdrawal of its army in Budapest with the new Nagy government.[2] On the following day, the paper published the Chinese government's statement supporting the Soviet stance[3] but this peace was not to last as, however, and the relaxed tone lasted only until November 4. An editorial on the front page claimed that the Nagy government "is not *halting* its treacherous activities against Hungarian socialism and Hungarian national interests" and declared its support for "Hungarian working people's struggle"[4] On 5th November, the entire front page was dedicated to the developments in Hungary and included a report that "counterrevolutionaries" had humiliated Chinese embassy personnel[5] and another article which described that "Nagy government and counterrevolutionaries had completely exposed themselves"[6]. Thereafter the reports in *People's Daily* finally became consistent, celebrating the "great victory of Hungarian people" while condemning the Nagy regime which "paved the way for the counterrevolutionaries"[7].

With an uncritical glance at those reports, one might believe that the confusing position on the Hungarian Revolution of *People's Daily* simply mirrored

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1 *People's Daily,* October 27 1956, 5.

2 *People's Daily,* November 1 1956, 1.

3 *People's Daily,* November 2 1956, 1.

4 *People's Daily,* November 4 1956, 1.

5 *People's Daily,* November 5 1956, 1.

6 *People's Daily,* November 5 1956, 1.

7 *People's Daily,* November 5 1956, 1.

the volatility of the Soviet policy towards the uprising. In reality the situation was more complex and was based on both the interpersonal and international networks of the Chinese Communist Party. Indeed, even something as basic as coverage of the event was determined by the ability of information to pass through the Chinese diplomatic network. *People's Daily* did not report on the event until the 27 October (Zhihua 2007, 24) as communications between the Chinese embassy in Budapest and the Foreign Ministry in Beijing had broken down from 23 to 26 October. This does not mean that the government was unaware of the events as Kruschev informed Liu Shaoqi that Soviet troops had entered Budapest on 24 October, with Liu deciding not to make a comment. Thus, Chinese party did not play a role in the decision of first Soviet military intervention (Zhihua 2007, 26; Vámos 2014).

From 27 to 29 October, Beijing was promoting inter-Communist state relationship based on *Pancha Shila*, in an attempt to weaken Soviet control over other socialist countries (Zhu 2016, 82). This was the reason behind the Soviet declaration on equal relations adopted on 30 October, which was then published in *People's Daily* on 1 November. However, Mao soon changed his mind after reading Soviet cable report on Hungarian situation on 30 October (Zhihua 2007, 32; Zhu 2016, 83). Chinese Party now stood firmly against Soviet withdrawal from Hungary. On the next day, the Soviet presidium changed their mind at Liu's suggestion. This time China's role was crucial to the decision of the second Soviet intervention (Zhihua 2007, 24).

This reveals the network effects of the positioning of the Chinese government and individuals. Although all avowedly, at the time, part of the same international movement the Chinese were unwilling to take any action or make any statement about the events in Hungary until they could verify the information for themselves and thus had little influence on events in Hungary during the revolution itself. The decision to re-invade, however, was more complex as Chinese leadership prompted the Soviet decision to oppose the Nagy government after receiving reports through the Soviet information network. Thus, information form the Soviet network was fed through the ideological lens of the Chinese leadership before being fed back into the Soviet Presidium. The network effects inherent in the Chinese and Soviet position thus allowed the Chinese government to position itself as an anti-imperialist bulwark internationally, through their role in the Ko-

rean War and recent Formosa Incident, while also hiding the weaknesses of their own centralized information network.

4. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Although we cannot know the impact of the Hungarian Revolution on the Chinese population we can study how the events resonated with the various networks and communities which make up the US. All levels of society were impacted, from the government down to civil society, by both the events and their fallout. The networks which were affected were changed for years to come which in turn impacted further networks both revealing the complexity of the events and the complexity of the interaction of networks in society.

Coverage of the events in Hungary was spotty at best which shaped popular reaction to the events and refugees. Although coverage began on November 2nd, which is admittedly ten days after the beginning of the revolution, some American news sources failed to provide full details until November 24th when The Saturday Evening Post finally deigned to cover the event (Varga 2002, 125). Even when they covered the event the facts were misleading or false due to the difficulty of establishing and maintaining reliable information networks on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Several newspapers assumed initially that Hungary would be allowed to follow its own independent path to Socialism and many assumed that Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia had been responsible for the uprising, at least indirectly (Varga 2002, 128).

The US establishment's response to the crisis was equally delayed and half-hearted, reflecting both the sheer volume of concurrent international events and underlying contradictions in US policy. Although international law considered the Soviets to be aggressors by the second intervention the US failed to offer anything substantial to support the Hungarians (Wright 1957, 268). The first US speeches given on the subject deplored the actions of the regime and offered sympathy for the people (Borhi 2004, 297) which was in line with US policy (Borhi 2016, 118). The US had been broadcasting messages of its "liberation policy" and "rollback" strategy through the Radio Free Europe since 1951 (Lendvai 2008, 185). Despite these stern words, and a half decade of strong diplomatic language, the US establishment chose to assure the Soviet leadership that there would be no intervention (McCauley 1981, 780). This contradiction, combined with the US me-

dia's focus on Poland and the Suez crisis, allowed Eisenhower to claim that he was defending freedom while taking no specific action (Varga 2002, 130). This position was vehemently opposed by the military which opposed any attempt to close off possible courses of action arguing that it might harm US credibility as an ally (Marchio 2002, 795). In the long term, it also forced a change in policy away from fostering a "spirit of resistance" and CIA action towards supporting the breakup of the Soviet empire by fostering nationalism (Marchio 2002, 787).

Humanitarian tendencies in the US rose to the fore after the failure of the US to respond forcefully to the crisis, supported almost universally by the wider US political establishment (Markowitz 1973, 52). The Government allocated $40,000,000 to help which augmented the $18,000,000 which was voluntarily raised (Sapir 1958, 310). Vice President Richard Nixon even flew to Austria to visit the refugee camps and a rapid response system was put in place which brought in, successfully, 38,000 refugees (Markowitz 1973, 58). While this was the largest number per capita it pales in comparison with other nations when wealth is considered as the initial outpouring of sympathy was eventually replaced with fears of communist infiltration (Markowitz 1973, 52). Indeed, this fear was present at the outset as the US banned refugees who were former communist party members from coming after December 27, 1952, unless they could prove they'd been involuntary members or were "defectors" (*United States: Immigration and Nationality Act* 1952, Sections 212 (a) (28) (I) (ii)). This contradiction, between the aspirations of US policy and the depths of US fears, would be a recurring theme in the Cold War and especially shaped the policy of the same Richard Nixon when he later became president (Kolodziej 1976, 125).

The issue of refugees revealed the complexity of the US's position, balancing its domestic history with its diplomatic needs. US governmental legal practice had not, historically, even distinguished between refugees and immigrants (Carey 1953, 66). However, progress was made prior to the revolution to deal with the war in Europe which culminated in the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 which allowed 341,000 as an emergency measure. Although this was not the first instance of the US making a distinction between refugees and immigrants it was the first emergency measure to deal with a specific refugee crisis which provided precedent for the invocation of parole power by the Attorney General to allow for an emergency group of 16,500 refugees, out of the 38,000, to be brought in (Roberts 1982, 4). The decision also overturned longstanding tradition which banned the importation of

workers who had been promised work upon arrival (Carey 1953, 69). Indeed, the US government took out advertisements asking for job offers to be sent in, including in academic journals ("Jobs for Hungarian Refugees" 1957, 187). However, it would take until 1980 for the US to adopt the UN's definition of a refugee (Huyck and Bouvier 1983, 40). This reflects continuing ambivalence and difficulty within domestic legal and political networks towards bringing US domestic legislation in line with international humanitarian law.

The Jewish community in the US was particularly affected by this passage as, although a shocking 2% of the Hungarian population fled the Soviet invasion, 14% of the Hungarian Jewish population fled. This influx greatly altered the makeup of Jewish communities in the US in the Jewish areas of cities as entire communities were transplanted from Hungary to the US (Sapir 1958, 311). This transportation created a series of network clusters as pre-existing nodes in the Hungarian Jewish network community moved en-masse to the US (Levine 2015, 120). Non-Jewish refugee arrivals, however, did not experience the same concentration as the Hungarian community in the US as, while they were generally concentrated in Greater New York, they were in no way as concentrated as the Jewish Hungarian community often due to intra-group conflicts such as class and politics (Kosa 1956, 367). They did, in the end, make up the third largest contingent of Hungarians in the large Hungarian New Brunswick community disrupting local community networks and helping establish new, transnational networks with communities still in Hungary (Tamas 1997, 620)

5. SOCIALIST WORLD

As in China little to no data exists on the individual networks impacted by the event and as such the network effects which can be studied are the interpersonal networks between leaders and leading cliques and the impact of technological networks on information diffusion and policy construction. A perfect confluence of these two networks was at play in the Romanian response and understanding of the crisis. Romania took an actively anti-Nagy stance to the revolution due to the reports issued by the Romanian ambassador to Hungary, Ion Popescu. His reports to the Romanian government were repeatedly criticized for being of poor quality, being usually late and even involving obvious spelling mistakes (Granville 2010, 312, 315). Instead of relying on direct information gather he often relied simply on

the reports generated by the East German ambassador Sepp Schwab, thus compounding his previous pro-Rákosi biases by parroting the Soviet line on the revolt rather than investigating the real causes (Granville 2010, 306). However, despite repeated reprimands by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs his close personal friendship with the leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, due to their time spent together in prison (Granville 2010, 316), he maintained his position and was even promoted afterwards (Granville 2010, 330).

Technological networks also disrupted both the Romanian and other governments' attempts to gather information about the crisis. Due to the violence communication lines were patchy during the crisis, as with the Chinese embassy, and newspapers stopped reporting after the fact as journalists went on strike (Granville 2010, 326). This shaped the understanding of events as some networks were disrupted while others managed to operate, changing with story was disseminated. Polish embassies and journalists maintained close links with the populace at large, thus shaping the Polish line to critique the "Rákosi- Gerő" clique (Granville 2003, 282–284) which contrasted with the Soviet line blaming foreign agents which was adopted by the Romanian establishment (Granville 2010, 306). This allowed the Polish government to walk the fine tightrope of reporting on the situation while maintaining sufficient allegiance to Moscow to avoid an intervention there (Granville 2003, 286). In East Germany, Walter Ulbricht performed the exact opposite feat as he was able to use the Stasi, an information network, and his interpersonal connections with the Soviet regime to enforce Stalinist discipline despite the emergence of the destalinization campaign even evidence of popular violence against communists in the GDR (Granville 1998).

As it was outside the Warsaw Pact, Yugoslavia was a unique case in the socialist world with its own networks, both personal and ideological. Tito maintained tentative links with Kruschev and the Soviets, including meeting with the Soviets in 1955 and signing a joint declaration in Belgrade which was interpreted in the West as an attempt to allow Tito to "act as a kind of branch manager for some of the satellites" (Thorning 1956, 101). These meetings, however, were overblown and instead should be understood to be an outcome of Kruschev's attempt to unify the Socialist camp through interpersonal network contact which continued through the revolution (Zonova 2007, 198). Even though these meetings came with substantial aid packages, including a promise of a combined $456 million from the Eastern Bloc (Lovitt 1958, 159), these efforts were complicated due to the presence

of Yugoslav reporters and academics at meetings of Hungarian dissidents before the revolution (Granville 2003, 275). Indeed, even the message of Destalinization was complicated as it was filtered through the internal ideological network of Yugoslavia leading Tito to believe that it would lead to sovereign equality of all Socialist states, not solely being confined to Soviet-Yugoslav relations (Barghoorn 1956, 30). Rhetorically the situation was further complicated due to Tito's continued statements in support of the superiority of the "Yugoslav Way" which created the illusion of an offensive attitude much like Eisenhower's "Liberation" rhetoric, both of which came from a position of geo-political stalemate (Granville 1998, 497). The arrival, and generally temporary stay, of 20,000 refugees from the Hungarian revolution (Kosinski 1978, 321) created real consequences for this rhetoric, bringing the domestic and international networks into direct connection. Although these refugees paled in comparison with the 502,000 Hungarians in Yugoslavia, as of the 1953 census, the delicate national situation in Yugoslavia required equally delicate management, a situation of which Tito was well aware (Ludanyi 1979, 233).

The complexity of these networks in the region help explain the variety of responses to the crisis and why many of the aims of destalinization, such as repairing the rift with Yugoslavia, failed to achieve their goal. Destalinization as a process revealed the tension inherent in Soviet policy: too much control weakens domestic support while too much autonomy threatens control (Jones 1977, 220). However, to simply place the states in the region upon this spectrum is to reduce the complexity of regional personal, information, and cultural networks to a single issue. Tito's complex relationship with the revolution, including fears of nationalistic spill-over and violence, played into his initial support of the Soviet invasion while his need to visibly appear and act independently of the Soviet Union vis a vis the third world and the West led him to allow Nagy asylum and thus led to the re-setting of Soviet-Yugoslav relations to their initial frosty status before destalinization began once Nagy was abducted (Granville 1998, 702). Indeed, the same ethnic fears were used as intellectual cover by Popescu in his messages shaping both his view of the crisis and the view of the Romanian government (Granville 2010, 316–317).

6. WESTERN WORLD

The international networks affected by these events represent the variety of communities as well as the relations between networks. Communist parties in Western Europe were all strongly negatively affected by these events, shedding members both locally and nationally (Thornton and Thompson 1997, 73). This was due to both the psychological impact of the "secret speech" and due to verbal and physical abuse by the general populace (Thornton and Thompson 1997, 82). Indeed, the Dutch Communist Party headquarters were the locations of protests and even riots after the second Soviet intervention (Hellema 1995, 174). However, this did not necessarily lead to the complete collapse of these parties as some managed to negotiate a subsidy from the Soviets which helped compensate for their loss in membership funds (Thornton and Thompson 1997, 73) while others distanced themselves intellectually from the Soviet line following furious internal debate (Denitch 1978, 151). The question of which parties could and did choose to continue to follow the Soviet line was down to informal network effects as, after the disbanding of the Cominform, there was no formal organization dedicated to coordinating and enforcing alignment with the Soviet brand of communism and control and influence was disseminated through networks of world communist leaders and apparatchiks (Bracke 2007, 58). Thus, individual social networks within communist party leadership groups helped maintain or weaken the communist parties in Western Europe as those who maintained coherence under domestic forms of legitimation, and thus were not so closely tied in with Soviet communism, were able to maintain support (Bracke 2007, 55).

Austria, as a country freshly liberated from Soviet occupation, was embedded in a particularly dense network of ideology, international politics, and population movements. The first impact was to drive Austria further into neutrality both as politicians reacted to the events and as the populace learned first-hand of the Soviet invasion (Lendvai 2008, 203). How could they not be impacted by the arrival of 95,000, then 150,000, and finally 170,000 refugees from November to January (Sapir 1958, 307)? These refugees were not simply new arrivals in the region as, due to the historic connections between Austria and Hungary, interpersonal and intellectual networks existed between these communities which in part acted as a draw for refugees (Granville 2006, 64). Indeed, just as individuals were flowing from Hungary to Austria after the revolution information had flown from Austria

to Hungary beforehand which inspired reformist farming communities along the border (Zonova 2007, 199). This jeopardized the newly adopted Swiss model of militarized neutrality, absent any guarantees from major powers. Internationally this was tricky as the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, wanted to use Austria as a Trojan horse to pull other EE states towards the US (Bischof 2000, 150). While this plan was obviously overly-ambitious, as has been addressed above, the events did have similar effects as with other Western countries with the added effect of rebuilding the perceptions of the armed forces, helping them overcome the shame of the Anschluss of 1938, and helping with the rehabilitation of their position in the state (Granville 2006, 70). To this day Austrian politics is riven by the revised position of the Austrian military, interfering with attempts to grapple with Austria's World War II past and stoking the hopes of the far right (Musner 2000, 79).

In terms of international alliances there was no concerted response due to the complexities of international networks. Although there was widespread condemnation led in part by Pakistan (Rajput 1973, 4) little else was done. The Dutch attempted to lead a diplomatic embargo of the Soviet Union but this had fallen apart by the 27th of December (Hellema 1995, 176). Indeed, despite the harsh language of Dutch diplomats they were domestically even harsher than the US when it came to the issue of refugees with Prime Minister Drees even requiring all refugees to sign a declaration that any "residence in the Netherlands would only be temporary" (Hellema 1995, 180). This distrust of immigrants also took on a racial element as the team in charge of selecting refugees for Dutch visas was instructed not to select any communists, AVH agents, criminals or gypsies (Hellema 1995, 181). Thus, domestic level considerations, and even individual ones such as racism, were transmitted into international policy which complicated any attempt to close ranks against Hungary and the Soviet Union. Even artistic policy was affected as the Hungarian pavilion at the 1958 Brussels Expo was used to legitimize the new Kadar regime for an international, individual, audience (Peteri 2012, 139).

Unlike the Dutch, the Canadians let in many refugees, without the same restrictions, which provided new impetus for the local community. Although the post-war wave of immigration of displaced persons had started in 1947 the stream of refugees became a torrent after the revolution, and after sustained efforts by Hungarian social and cultural networks within Canada (Lanphier 1981, 114), which resulted in 30,000 refugees arriving by the end of 1957 (Dreisziger 2000,

249). The class and cultural makeup of these refugees, different than that of the members of the pre-war wave of immigrants, aided in the collapse of leftist Hungarian organizations in Canada and the creation of new cultural ties and forms of media both within Canada and across the border with the US. New publications, such as *Kanadai Magyarsag* and the Jewish *Menora Egyenloseg* shifted established new readerships in the region with the latter even becoming the principle paper of Magyar Jews in North America (Dreisziger, 2000, 250). These same emigrant community networks fed back into international individual and political networks in Europe when the émigrés returned on travel, often returning home to Hungary bringing stories of the West and even while travelling in Europe where they spread stories of Hungary and were, for a while after the revolution, considered as victims and heroes through-out the West (Lenart and Cooper 2012, 381).

7. CONCLUSION

What is to be learned about these events from this broad and winding study? First and foremost is that any attempt to draw singular lines of causation from event to conclusion are problematic. What is more important is to understand the sheer volume of voices who, by their cacophony, can shape policy in ways which would seem unclear from any singular study. This also affects the issue of memory as, when looking back for clear lines of causation, it can be easy to inadvertently miss out on some of the multitude of actors and networks who were touched and shaped by such an event.

Introducing a study of networks and network effects creates a more complete picture of the event and of those affected by it. Diaspora, religious, and political communities across Europe and the Western World, shattering pre-existing linkages and reshaping their ways of being and understanding. Information networks shaped leader's responses to the crisis and popular understanding of the events. Further research is needed to examine how exactly information was passed from node to node and how these networks interacted with other community and political networks. Failing to do so results in a partial understanding and memory of the event. While all information is valuable, including in depth studies of individual communities and leader's positions and responses, without a conceptual framework the information remains isolated and unrelated. This volume of actors and connections needs to be understood when remembering an event or the vari-

ety of impacts can be lost. And what is the study of history if not the study of the wonderful variety of events and personal experiences which make up our story?

PERIODICALS

"Celebrating the great victory of Hungarian people." 1956. *People's Daily*, November 5.

"Declaration by the Soviet government on the Principles of Development and further Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and other socialist states." 1956. *People's Daily*, November 1.

"Nagy government and counterrevolutionaries have completely exposed their true selves. Bloody terror reached an unprecedented scale." 1956. *People's Daily*, November 5.

"Our embassy personnel in Hungary were humiliated by counterrevolutionaries." 1956. *People's Daily*, November 5.

"Patriotic Hungarian People, struggle for the defence of socialism and defeat of counter-revolutionary restoration!" 1956. *People's Daily*, November 4.

"Students in Budapest and other cities held peaceful demonstrations. Counterrevolution-ary elements infiltrated and created armed riots. Hungarian government invited So-viet army in Hungary to restore order." 1956. *People's Daily*, October 27.

"The statement of the government of People's Republic of China on the declaration by the Soviet government on 30 October 1956." 1956. *People's Daily*, November 2.

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Mađarski kaleidoskop: Mađarska revolucija 1956. u gustoj mreži međunarodnih veza

Revolucije uvek predstavljaju izuzetno kompleksne događaje koji usložnjavaju i istorijsko pamćenje. Razumeti njihov uticaj značajno je za holistički pristup njihovom razvoju i vezama, posebno u umreženom savremenom svetu. Ovaj rad nastoji da očuva pojedine od mnoštva uticaja ovog događaja i načina na koje su različite mreže, od individualnih do međunarodnih, bile pod uticajem ovog događaja. Uključujući mnoštvo mreža i pozicija pod utcajem revolucije omogućilo je konstruisanje mnogo složenijeg razumevanja istorije. Kako prostor članka nije dozvoljavao potpunije istraživanje različitih mreža koje su dotaknute revolucijom 1956, odabirom određenih primera složenih umrežavanja, omogućilo je novu platformu za dalja istraživanja. Uzimajući holistički pristup revoluciji u ovom radu se daje pregled različitih složenih mreža dotaknutih revolucijom i uticaja postojećih mreža i sistema vrednosti u recepciji krize.

Ključne reči: mreže, Mađarska revolucija, 1956, istorijsko pamćenje, izbeglice